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Abstract 
The increase in crimes targeting the cloud is increasing the amount of data that must be analysed 
during a digital forensic investigation, exacerbating the problem of processing such data in a 
timely manner. Since collecting all possible evidence proactively could be cumbersome to 
analyse, evidence collection should mainly focus on gathering the data necessary to investigate 
potential security breaches that can exploit vulnerabilities present in a particular cloud 
configuration. Cloud elasticity can also change the attack surface available to an adversary and, 
consequently, the way potential security breaches can arise. Therefore, evidence collection 
should be adapted depending on changes in the cloud configuration, such as those determined by 
allocation/deallocation of virtual machines. In this paper, we propose to use attack scenarios to 
configure more effective evidence collection for cloud services. In particular, evidence collection 
activities are targeted to detect potential attack scenarios that can violate existing security 
policies. These activities also adapt when new/different attacks scenarios can take place due to 
changes in the cloud configuration. We illustrate our approach by using examples of insider and 
outsider attacks. Our results demonstrate that using attack scenarios allows us to target evidence 
collection activities towards those security breaches that are likely, while saving space and time 
necessary to store and process such data. 
Keywords: forensic readiness; cloud computing; adaptive software; attack planning, digital 
investigation 
 
1. Introduction 
 Although recent years have seen substantial market growth in the usage of cloud services, 
such services are increasingly the target of cyber-crimes [1]. For example, a recent attack 
targeting JP Morgan Chase [2] likely exploited the lack of two factor authentication for gaining 
access to user information from over 76 millions house holds. To assess how a cyber-crime was 
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perpetrated, what harm was done, and who are the parties responsible, existing systems must be 
forensic ready [3] and, in particular, support targeted data collection. This would allow 
preserving relevant data that might provide evidence necessary for prosecution. Such data can 
reside at both the customer and the provider premises, and, therefore, the partitioning of forensic 
responsibilities between the cloud service providers and the customers may depend on the cloud 
service model used. 
 The increase in crimes targeting the cloud has also increased the amount of data that must 
be analysed during a digital forensic investigation, exacerbating the problem of processing such 
data in a timely manner. Moreover, while cloud computing provides an “elastic” environment for 
storage and computing resources to be provided and released on demand, the evidence necessary 
to investigate a cyber-crime can be volatile and may no longer be available after a security 
breach is perpetrated. Collecting all possible evidence proactively is not always a viable solution, 
since it can be too voluminous and cumbersome to analyse effectively. Instead, we suggest 
evidence collection activities should focus on gathering the data necessary to investigate 
potential security breaches that can exploit vulnerabilities present in a particular cloud 
configuration. 
 Cloud elasticity can also change the attack surface available to an adversary and, 
consequently, the way potential security breaches can arise. Therefore, cloud-related changes, 
such as those determined by allocation/deallocation of virtual machines (VMs) or the 
modification of physical/virtual machines configurations, should be detected and monitored, and 
the corresponding data collection activities should be adapted accordingly. 
 In this paper, we address the above concerns by proposing the use of attack scenarios [4] 
to engineer more effective evidence collection for cloud services. Attack scenarios represent a 
sequence of actions an adversary can perform to achieve her criminal goals (e.g., compromising 
a physical or virtual machine, or copying a VM image). Automated generation of attack 
scenarios [5, 4, 6, 7, 8] has been utilised extensively to identify the security breaches that are 
likely and to focus the security strategy of an organisation on their prevention. However, this 
might not always be possible; for example, as a security patch might not yet be available or a 
cloud provider may have to rely on the customer to apply such patches. Our approach, instead, 
builds on the intuition that attack scenarios can help reduce the amount of data to be preserved in 
the cloud, by focusing data collection activities on the security breaches that are likely. 
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 Our approach helps configure evidence collection activities for preserving the data 
necessary to explain how potential attacks are perpetrated. We model explicitly the cloud 
configuration, the security breaches and the basic actions that an adversary can perform to 
achieve her criminal goals (i.e. cause a security breach). These basic actions can be legitimate, 
such as access to a VM, or malicious, i.e. attack modules, that an adversary can execute to 
exploit existing vulnerabilities. We assume attack modules are defined systematically by a 
security administrator from vulnerability databases (e.g., CVE
1
) documenting existing 
vulnerabilities and how they can be exploited. Basing them on the representation of the cloud 
configuration, the security breaches, and the basic actions of an adversary, we use planning 
techniques to identify attack scenarios that achieve the security breaches by exploiting the 
current cloud configuration. Our technique cannot identify evidence related to attacks exploiting 
vulnerabilities that are unknown to the software vendor. Nevertheless, identifying attack 
scenarios exploiting known vulnerabilities is a challenging problem, as the complexity of a cloud 
computing environment makes it difficult for a security administrator to foresee all possible 
attack scenarios exploiting vulnerabilities introduced by the software components installed. 
 We then map each basic action composing the attack scenarios to the data to be collected 
at the cloud service provider premises for demonstrating their execution. Finally, we adapt the 
evidence collection activities in reaction to changes of the cloud environment or updates of 
available attacks modules, which may be the sources of new/different attack scenarios. Such 
changes are monitored constantly and reflected onto the model representing the cloud 
configuration and the basic actions that can be perpetrated by an adversary. Note that we 
proposed the notion of adaptive digital forensics in previous work [9, 10] for adapting the 
evidence collection and analysis activities of a digital forensic investigation depending on the 
likelihood of possible hypotheses of a crime. However, unlike our previous work, in this paper 
we propose to adapt evidence collection activities depending on changes in the cloud 
configuration and in existing vulnerabilities. 
 We illustrate our approach by using examples of cyber-crimes targeting cloud customers 
and providers. We do not consider additional cases [11] such as the use by an adversary of cloud 
resources to perpetrate a crime (e.g., to build botnets, to store and share illicit material). Our 
simplified examples are set in an Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud deployment including 
                                                 
1
https://cve.mitre.org/index.html 
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one service provider and several customers all sharing that infrastructure and resources. For this 
reason, in this paper we assume that the collection process does not breach the regulations of the 
jurisdiction in which the data are collected, and does not compromise the confidentiality of other 
tenants that share the resources. We evaluated our approach by estimating the percentage of data 
that it avoids collecting, and measuring the time required to generate attack scenarios for cloud 
configurations of increasing complexity. Our results demonstrate that using attack scenarios 
allows us to target evidence collection activities only in those situations in which security 
breaches are likely, while saving space and time necessary to store and process such data. We 
believe this is a reasonable simplification for preserving relevant evidence, and issues such as 
regulatory compliance can be addressed separately. Furthermore, attack scenarios can be 
generated in a negligible time even for cloud configurations representing realistic data centers. 
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 motivates our approach by 
discussing related work. Section 3 describes scenarios supporting the need for adaptive evidence 
collection in the cloud. Section 4 provides an overview of our approach. Section 5 explains how 
attack scenarios are generated for cases of insider and outsider attacks. Section 6 illustrates how 
evidence collection and monitoring of changes in the cloud environment are performed. Section 
7 presents our evaluation and Section 8 concludes. 
2. Related Work 
 Recently, researchers have analysed the digital forensic challenges brought by cloud 
computing [12, 13, 14, 15]. Wolthusen [12] notes that one of the major challenges is the 
collection of evidence across multiple virtual hosts, physical machines, data centers, and 
geographical and legal jurisdictions. Taylor et al. [13] emphasise the ephemerality of evidence 
stored in the cloud, such as registry entries (on Microsoft Windows platforms) or temporary 
internet files that can be lost when a customer leaves the service. Ruan et al. [14] suggest the 
need of approaches to continuously preserve volatile data and guarantee data segregation among 
multiple tenants and in various cloud service models. Grispos et al. [15] highlight the challenges 
that an investigator may face while analysing an extremely large amount of data placed in the 
cloud by a customer. Cloud environments have also been suggested as a basis for conducting 
digital forensic investigations [16]. In particular, cloud virtual instances and storage can be used, 
respectively, to gather and store evidence relative to potential or detected incidents/crimes. 
 Existing research has started exploring technical solutions to perform evidence collection 
Page 5 of 42
in the cloud. For example, Birk and Wegener [17] assess the usability of various sources of 
evidence for investigative purposes in all three major cloud service models (SaaS, PaaS, IaaS). 
Dykstra and Sherman [18] expose technical and trust issues that arise in acquiring forensic 
evidence from IaaS cloud deployments by using existing forensic acquisition tools (EnCase [19] 
and AccessData Forensic Toolkit [20]). The authors also suggest that evidence should be 
collected at the virtual machine level, where a web system interfaces with the provider’s 
underlying filesystem and hypervisor. The advantages lie in the fact that evidence can be 
collected “on-demand” by several parties, including customers, providers and lawyers. A tool 
providing such functionalities was subsequently developed by Dykstra et al. [21] to support 
forensic acquisition of virtual disks associated with VMs, logs of all APIs requests made to the 
cloud provider for administering virtual machines, and OpenStack firewall logs for any of the 
customers’ virtual machines. Shields et al. [22] created a proof-of-concept continuous forensic 
evidence collection system that could be used in the cloud, for example, to record the deletion 
and creation of service provisions. However, in large scale environments like the cloud, 
monitoring all possible evidence is not a viable solution, as it might be cumbersome to analyse. 
Existing work has mainly focused on how evidence can be collected in the cloud without 
providing guidance on what data should be preserved. Although triaging techniques have also 
been proposed as a means of reducing the amount of data to be analysed in conventional 
investigations [23], they have not been applied to target evidence collection activities towards the 
preservation of the data necessary to investigate the security breaches that are more likely. 
Furthermore, none of the existing approaches have focused on how to adapt evidence collection 
depending on the potential attack scenarios brought about by the current cloud configuration. 
 Our approach automatically generates attack scenarios through planning in order to 
identify the security breaches that are likely and the evidence that should be collected to 
investigate them. Attack planning [5, 4] has mainly been used to anticipate zero-day attacks 
against the networked computing infrastructures of an organisation and to improve penetration 
testing tools. Krautsevich et al. [6] propose to generate attack scenarios depending on the 
knowledge and resources possessed by an adversary. The authors assume an attacker can 
recompute her strategy dynamically in case an attack step is unsuccessful. This allows companies 
to focus their security strategies to prevent the most likely attacks. Similarly, Sarraute et al. [7] 
generate attack scenarios by taking into account lack of knowledge an adversary has about the 
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network topology. LeMay et al. [8] represent explicitly how an adversary is likely to attack the 
system depending on her preferences, actions cost, payoff and probability of detection. However, 
automated attack planning research has not addressed the problem of effective evidence 
collection in the cloud. 
 In our approach attack scenarios are generated automatically after the model of the cloud 
configuration, the security breaches and the attack modules representing existing vulnerabilities 
are defined by the security administrator. Considering the vulnerabilities associated with specific 
software products installed allows us to identify concrete attack scenarios and hence specific 
monitoring activities that collect forensic evidence necessary to demonstrate that these attacks 
took place. Cloud security reference architectures [24] provide guidance for identifying potential 
misuse cases [25] arising from the interaction of stakeholders with the system and for detecting a 
set of security patterns, which include countermeasures to prevent or mitigate those misuse 
cases. Security patterns also include a general list of components of the cloud architecture, such 
as VMs and networks, from which forensic evidence regarding a specific misuse pattern can be 
found. Introducing the usage of a reference architecture in our approach could lead to the 
identification of a more complete set of security breaches, referred to as threats. However, 
reference architectures are too general and do not suggest ways to implement monitoring 
activities to collect forensic evidence of specific attacks. Moreover they do not consider 
adaptation of security patterns, which might be necessary when the cloud configuration changes. 
3. Adaptive Evidence Collection Scenarios 
 In this section we explain how cloud-related changes affecting virtual and physical 
machines and jurisdictions can require modifying the evidence collection strategy at the cloud 
service provider. 
 Virtual machine changes are related to the allocation/deallocation of new or existing 
VMs or to the modification of their software configuration. In particular, changes a customer 
performs on the VMs she is authorised to use, such as installation of third party applications, 
might introduce vulnerabilities that can be exploited by an adversary. The introduction of new 
vulnerabilities may require a change in the evidence collection strategy to be enacted since new 
or different attack scenarios might be likely. Privileges over a VM determine whether a customer 
is authorised to use a specific VM, deploy third party applications within the VM, or make a 
copy of the present state of the VMs, including all the data contained within or associated with 
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the VM. Privileges that are currently granted and revoked to customers over specific VMs can 
affect how possible attacks can be perpetrated, and, therefore, may require modification of the 
evidence collection strategy depending on their current state. 
 Similarly, physical machine changes are related to the acquisition/dismissal of 
new/existing physical machines or to the modification of their software configuration. These 
changes can affect how insider attacks [26] and intrusions are performed. For example, the 
physical machine on which a VM is hosted can affect potential attacks scenarios. For instance, if 
a VM is hosted on a physical machine an administrator can login to and make copies of VM 
images, confidential data could be stolen easily by a malicious administrator. In this case, it will 
be necessary to collect information related to VM copy operations and logins on the physical 
machine. However, in another case, if a VM is installed on a physical machine an adversary 
cannot login to, she must exploit existing vulnerabilities of that physical machine (e.g., perform a 
buffer overflow attack) to gain the root privileges and copy the image of the target VM. In this 
case, different evidence should be collected in addition to the evidence specified in the previous 
case (e.g., networks connections and open ports of the machine, executing processes). 
 Jurisdiction changes are related to the modification of the privacy or security regulations 
a cloud provider should comply with. Indeed some evidence collection activities might no longer 
be legal in the new jurisdiction and might be restrained. Cloud provider merges (e.g., cloud 
provider outsources part of its services to IaaS offered by other providers) are also relevant as 
they might require to include evidence collection activities to comply with the SLAs negotiated 
with external providers. 
4. Overall Approach 
 An overview of our approach is shown in Figure 1. A Planning activity generates 
potential attack scenarios by using the information coming from potential Security Breaches, the 
Cloud Configuration, and the possible Attack Modules. We assume that these models are initially 
created and periodically updated by the system administrators at the provider premises. 
 Security breaches represent possible criminal goals of an adversary, which may violate 
the policies of an organisation or the regulations of a specific jurisdiction in which the violation 
takes place. For example, an adversary can aim to steal customers’ sensitive data stored on a 
target VM, or compromise a physical/virtual host (e.g., by installing untrusted software that can 
escalate her privileges). An attack can be perpetrated by individuals assuming different roles. An 
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adversary can be an administrator appointed by the host company, a customer with allocated 
virtual machines or an external individual who is not authorised to use or access the cloud 
infrastructure. 
 The cloud configuration models object types, objects instantiations and their states. 
Object types can represent, for example, physical and virtual machines, authoritative domains, 
installed software components, network connections, customers or system administrators at the 
hosting company. Object instantiations represent concrete objects of a specific type. Initial states 
can be used to identify, for example, the location of physical and virtual machines and their 
software configuration, network connections, open ports of physical and virtual hosts, or the 
authorisations granted to customers and administrators. 
 The cloud configuration also includes the legitimate actions that can be performed by the 
customers and system administrators within the cloud deployment. These are expressed in terms 
of pre- and post-conditions (effects) on the state of some of the objects represented in the cloud 
configuration. For example, some actions can be used to allocate/deallocate a VM, perform 
login/logout, or copy the image of a VM hosted on a physical machine. In this example, the 
pre-condition necessary to perform a copy of a VM image is that the user is an administrator 
logged on the physical machine hosting the target VM and s/he is authorised to perform a copy 
of the VM image or the user is a customer that has been allocated the VM and s/he is authorised 
to use it. 
 Attack modules represent malicious actions that can be performed by an adversary to 
compromise a virtual or physical host. These actions can also be expressed in terms of pre- and 
post-conditions on the state of the objects belonging to the cloud configuration. Attack modules 
leverage vulnerabilities that are present in existing hosts. For example, the following action 
( ) represents a local exploit that uses a vulnerability
2
 of VMware 
Workstation (versions 5.x and 6.x), which allows a local user to gain root privileges by installing 
a library path option in a configuration file. In this action parameter  is used to identify a 
physical machine ( ). The precondition requires either the existence of a user ( ) 
administering a physical machine to be logged on to it or the physical machine to be 
compromised. The physical machine should also run VMWare Workstation (versions 5.x or 6.x). 
The post-condition represents the fact that a local exploit is installed and has assigned root 
                                                 
2
http://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2008-0967/ 
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privileges. 
 We recognise that many of the vulnerabilities exploited by available attack modules can 
be patched by cloud providers. However, for some exploits a patch might not be available yet or 
the cloud provider may be at the mercy of the customer when it comes to applying patches 
(especially for IaaS cloud deployments). 
 The Attack Scenarios generated by the planning activity represent a sequence of 
legitimate or malicious actions that an attacker can perform to achieve a specific goal. We 
express the planning problem by using PDDL (Planning Domain Definition Language)
3
. A 
PDDL planning problem is expressed in terms of a domain and a problem definition. Different 
problem definitions may be connected to the same domain description just like several instances 
may exist of a class in Object Oriented Programming. The domain definition includes a 
representation of the objects types, constants, predicates expressed on objects and constants, and 
a set of actions. Each action has a set of parameters (variables that may be instantiated with 
objects), preconditions and effects. The problem definition includes the definition of all the 
possible objects, the initial conditions of the planning environment (a conjunction of true/false 
facts), and the definition of goal states (a logical expression over facts that should be true/false in 
a goal-state of the planning environment). The output of the planner is usually a totally or 
partially ordered plan (a sequence of actions) necessary to achieve the goal specified in the 
problem definition from the initial conditions of the planning environment. 
 In our approach we use the domain definition to model object types, such as physical and 
virtual machines, and their states (i.e. predicates expressed on these objects). We also use the 
                                                 
3
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Planning_Domain_Definition_Language 
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domain definition to represent the legitimate actions that can be performed by cloud users and 
administrators as well as malicious actions performed by an adversary (attack modules). The 
problem definition is used to define concrete object instantiations of a specific type in the cloud 
environment and their initial state. In our case, the goal state refers to a specific security breach 
that the attack scenario aims to achieve. The output of the planner returns a sequence of 
legitimate or malicious actions that an offender can perform to achieve a specific goal. We chose 
to use PDDL as it is widely supported by several planners and allows ranking potential attack 
scenarios depending on specific metrics, such as number of actions in the scenario, or estimated 
harm caused by the attack, which are fundamental features to prioritise evidence collection 
strategies. 
 The Evidence Collection activity can be configured systematically after possible attack 
scenarios are generated. The evidence that should be collected is that necessary to verify whether 
the post-conditions of each (legitimate or malicious) action within the attack scenario are 
satisfied. This information can be extracted from the events recorded in the log files associated 
with the software installed in the cloud deployment. We expect that collected evidence will be 
useful during future investigations to reconstruct the events leading to a security breach and 
locate the vulnerabilities that were exploited. 
 The elasticity of a cloud environment requires continuous monitoring of cloud related 
changes (e.g., location of physical and virtual machines, software configuration of physical and 
virtual hosts). Such changes must be reflected on the domain and problem definition used during 
planning. To achieve this aim, we also configure a Monitoring activity which identifies potential 
changes that may affect the state of the objects instantiated in the problem definition, update the 
problem definition accordingly, and trigger a re-planning of the attacks scenarios. Updates of 
existing attack modules are also taken into account, as they can modify potential attack scenarios 
and, consequently, the evidence collection activities. We assume security administrators are 
notified when vulnerability databases contain new entries for the specific software versions 
installed in the current cloud deployment. Finally, we assume that modifications of the type of 
the objects belonging to the cloud configuration (e.g., a new software can be installed) are 
performed manually by the security administrator and may trigger updates when the new 
software is bringing known vulnerabilities. 
5. Attack Scenarios Generation 
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 In this section, we describe how the cloud configuration, the security breaches, and the 
attack modules are represented in PDDL, by using a simplified example of an Infrastructure as a 
Service (IaaS) cloud deployment. Subsequently, we explain how these models are used during 
planning to generate the attack scenarios. In particular, we consider two sets of scenarios, Insider 
attacks, where the adversary is an authorised individual at the cloud service provider premises, 
such as a malicious administrator, and Outsider attacks, where the attacks are perpetrated by a 
malicious customer or an external adversary. We also explain how changes in the cloud 
configuration trigger modifications in the attack scenarios (and, therefore, in the evidence 
collection strategy described in Section 6.1). 
5.1. Cloud Configuration, Attack Modules, and Security Breaches 
 The initial Cloud Configuration of our example cloud deployment is presented in Figure 
2. It comprises three physical machines ( , , and ) located within two different domains 
(  and ). All machines can accept network connections from the others.  and  belong to 
domain a while  belongs to domain . Each physical machine can host VMs; for example,  
hosts virtual machines . Each physical and virtual machine is characterised by a specific 
software and network configuration. Although we identified the VMs (in grey) hosted on each 
physical machine, for reasons of simplicity in this initial scenario we only consider the 
configuration of the physical machines. We subsequently introduce some of the configuration of 
the virtual machines when describing further attack scenarios. 
 Each physical machine is described by its operating system, virtualisation software, open 
ports and offered services. For example, as shown in Figure 2, the operating system ( ) of  
and  is , while the operating system of  is . The 
virtualisation software ( ) of , , and  is 
, , and , respectively. Ports  and  
are used for TCP networking and Web2Host connections, respectively. The services offered by 
each machine are Ruby vSphere Console ( ) on , Application Lifecycle Service ( ) on 
m2, and Shared Trace Service ( ) on . The  service is a Linux console UI for the 
VMWare vCenter Server Appliance v5. Access to this console allows users authenticated 
remotely to execute arbitrary commands as root, potentially granting themselves administrative 
privileges. The  service offered by the HP Helion Cloud Development Platform allows users 
to create VMs using a seed node image, where all VMs sharing the same node image also share 
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the same security key. Therefore a user having access to one of these VMs can also access the 
other ones created with the same seed node image. The  service of HP OpenStack 
Overview 7.5 is used to log the actions performed by the OpenStack components for debugging 
purposes. 
 We also represent cloud users (administrators and customers) and their privileges, 
explicitly. In this initial scenario we have one administrator ( ) who is authorised to login 
to  and  and perform copies of the images of the virtual machines hosted on . 
 The planning problem can be expressed in terms of a domain and a problem definition. 
The domain definition comprises a representation of the objects types, the legitimate and the 
malicious actions (attack modules) that can be performed, and the predicates adopted in the 
actions specification. The problem definition includes the objects instantiations in the cloud 
environment, their initial state and the potential crime goals. 
 The object types are defined using the :  keyword. Examples of object types 
representing virtual machines, physical machines, users, services and ports are expressed as 
follows. 
  
Some object types have constant values and are specified using the :  keyword. In 
particular, a set of constant names is followed by its type (preceded by symbol ‘–’). The 
following constants identify port  and the , , and  services. 
 
 The domain model also includes predicate definitions (keyword : ). The 
predicates are used to define the required pre- and post-condition of the possible actions. Each 
predicate is specified by a name and a set of parameters ( < > – 
< >. Some of the predicates are presented below and allow identifying the 
physical machine hosting a VM ( ), the operations an administrator is allowed to 
execute on a physical machine ( ) and the user authorised to use a VM 
( ). 
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 The following example describes a legitimate action ( ) that can be performed 
to copy a virtual machine. Actions are expressed in PDDL by using the :  keyword. An 
action is characterised by a name, pre- and post-conditions (effects), and a set of parameters used 
in the definition of such conditions. Pre-conditions and effects are expressed as a set of 
predicates in conjunction or disjunction. The precondition for copying a VM is that either a) a 
user is an administrator that is logged on the physical machine on which the VM is hosted and 
has the right to copy the VMs hosted on it, or b) the user is a customer who is logged an on the 
VM allocated to her and is authorised to perform a copy, or c) the VM is allocated on a 
compromised physical machine. If either of these conditions is satisfied the VM image can be 
copied. 
 Attack modules describe the malicious actions that can be performed by an adversary to 
exploit the vulnerabilities brought by the software installed in the physical and virtual machines 
that are present in the cloud configuration. We use the Common Vulnerability Exposure database 
(CVE) to identify the vulnerabilities associated with each software version and assess how they 
can be exploited. From this information the security administrator can define the action 
describing how the attack modules can exploit the vulnerabilities. Such actions are included in 
the domain definition. 
 For example,  virtualisation software 
Page 14 of 42
introduces a new vulnerability (
4
). In particular, this vulnerability can be 
exploited by the  attack module, which can be performed if a user is 
logged on a VM allocated on a physical machine running VMWAre vCenter version 5.x. The 
effect of this attack module is to allow a VM user to run the rvc service on the physical machine 
in which the vm is allocated. This enables the precondition of  attack 
module, and allows a user to grant herself the administrator privileges on the physical machine 
hosting the vm and the right to perform logins and copies of the VMs allocated on that machine. 
 Security breaches represent the goals of an adversary, such as unauthorised access to a 
customer’s sensitive information or escalation of privileges on a physical or virtual machine. 
Security breaches are represented as :  in the PDDL problem definition and represent the 
final state that must be achieved after the actions comprised in an attack scenario are executed. A 
possible security breach can be determined when there exists a malicious user who is authorised 
to use a VM ( ) that is not being assigned to him ( ) 
and performs a copy of the VM image ( ). This security breach is described by the 
following PDDL code snippet. 
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5.2. Planning 
 We use a planner to determine whether there exists a sequence of legitimate or malicious 
actions, given an initial state of the system, that would make it possible for an adversary to 
perpetrate a security breach. If such a sequence of actions exists, it forms an attack scenario. The 
planner accepts as input the PDDL domain definition described in the previous section and the 
problem definition. The problem definition represents concrete object instances, their initial 
states, and the objective to be achieved (i.e. security breach). The problem definition makes use 
of the objects types and predicates defined in the domain model of the cloud configuration. For 
example, in the problem definition below ( ) we leverage the domain definition partially 
presented in the previous section ( ) to represent objects instantiations, such as 
physical machines ( ,  and ), virtual machines ( ,  and ), users ( , ,  and 
) and administrative domains (  and ). The problem definition defines the 
initial state of the objects from which an attack scenario aimed to achieve a security breach 
should be perpetrated. In this example, each VM is hosted ( ) on a different physical 
machine, each physical machine exists in an administrative domain and each customer is 
authorised to use a different VM. The problem definition also includes the security breach to be 
achieved (i.e. the crime goal described earlier). 
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 We model the domain and problem definitions by using PDDL 3.0 and use SGPlan5
5
 to 
generate possible attack scenarios. The rest of the section describes examples of possible insider 
and outsider attack scenarios
6
. 
5.2.1. Insider Attacks 
 An insider attack originates from people within the organisation, such as employees, 
former employees, contractors or business associates, who have insider information concerning 
the organisation’s security practices, data and computer systems. The domain and the problem 
definition reflect the cloud configuration presented in Figure 2. In this scenario the administrator 
( ) at the hosting company is authorised to login to the physical machines (  and ) of 
her authoritative domain ( ) and perform copies of the images of the VMs hosted on . 
Possible attack modules include  (presented in Section 4), which 
exploits a vulnerability present in VMWare vCenter SA 5 virtualisation software. 
 For example, a malicious adversary can be an administrator ( ) who aims to copy 
the image of a VM (e.g.,  hosted on ) containing sensitive information of a customer 
(predicate ), while she is logged to the physical machine hosting the VM (predicate 
). This security breach can be expressed as follows. 
To achieve the above goal and adversary can perform the following sequence of actions from the 
cloud configuration represented in Figure 2. These are the actions comprised in the attack 
scenario identified by the planner (Case 1.1). 
The administrator can login to , since she has the right to do so as  belongs to her 
administrative domain ( ). Subsequently, she can execute an 
 to compromise  (i.e. gain root privileges), and copy the image 
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of v8. 
 If the target virtual machine (e.g., ) is hosted on a physical machine ( ) that does 
not belong to the authoritative domain of the administrator, the number of steps required to copy 
the image of  increases, as shown in the following attack scenario (Case 1.2). 
First, the administrator has to compromise  (steps 0-2), as explained in the previous attack 
scenario. Subsequently, she connects to  to run service  on port  and executes 
the HP openview remote buffer overflow attack module
7
 (steps 3-6). This exploits a 
vulnerability present in ( ), which allows an 
adversary to assign herself the root privileges when the ovtrcd service is executed. Subsequently, 
 is marked as compromised and the admin can copy the image of  (steps 7-8). 
5.3. Outsider Attacks 
 Outsider attacks are perpetrated by individuals from outside the organisation who do not 
have information related to the organisation security practices, data and computer systems. 
Outsider attackers can be registered customers or external individuals. To generate the attack 
scenarios we refer to the cloud configuration specified in Figure 3. In particular, we specify the 
permissions of three customers:  and  use virtual machines  and , respectively, hosted 
on , while  uses  hosted on . Based on this modified cloud configuration, a malicious 
customer (  or ) can aim to copy the image of a virtual machine (e.g., ) allocated to 
another customer (e.g., ). This security breach can be expressed as follows, where the goal of 
a malicious user c is to become an authorised customer of  that is already in use by another 
customer. 
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In this case the planner generates the following attack scenario (Case 2.1). 
 For example,  can perform the login to her virtual machine, since she has the right to 
do so and exploit the vulnerability
8
 present in  virtualisation software to run the  service. 
Using the this service  can grant herself administrative privileges over  (steps 0-2). By 
using such privileges she can establish a network connection with  and allocate a new virtual 
machine (e.g., ) on her behalf (steps 3-4). Subsequently,  can login to the newly created 
virtual machine and exploit the vulnerability (
9
) brought by the HP Helion 
Cloud Development Platform installed on . In particular, since all virtual machines created 
using the  seed node image have a universal security key by default, the customer can access 
the other VMs in the  cluster that share the same security key. In the attack scenario above 
 exploits the security key generated for her VM ( ) to login to , which is allocated to 
another customer (steps 5-7). 
 In a second scenario, Case 2.2, a virtual machine related change takes place. In particular, 
customer  installs the  ( )  to host web 
content. The customer can manage the web content by accessing Gecko through a standard web 
browser, such as Google Chrome. The new cloud configuration is shown in Figure 4. Changes in 
the cloud configuration may determine changes in the attack modules available in order to reflect 
the vulnerabilities brought by the new software. In this case, for example,  brings 
a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability (
10
), which allows remote 
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adversaries to hijack the authentication of legitimate users. This can be achieved by including a 
link or script in a page that accesses a site to which the user is known (or is supposed) to have 
authenticated access. For example, an adversary can circumvent the customer by enforcing her to 
open an HTML image element that references an action on ’s virtual machine, such as a 
 request creating a new VM user. Due to the CMS vulnerability it is likely that ’s 
browser keeps her authentication information in a cookie. If the cookie has not yet expired, the 
attempt by ’s browser to load the image will submit the malicious request to  successfully 
without asking for ’s approval. As a result, the external adversary can login to  as a 
legitimate user. 
 For this case, we hypothesise that an unknown adversary ( ) aims to gain access to a 
specific virtual machine (  hosted on ). The goal of the adversary in this case is the same as 
the one defined for Case 2.1. For this security breach, the planner generates the following attack 
scenario. 
In this scenario,  logins to  and connects to the  through a web browser (steps 
0-1). The external attacker  can enforce the execution of a command from ’s browser that 
creates a new local user of  by exploiting the CSRF vulnerability brought by the CMS (step 
2). Once  has access to , she can exploit the  service to grant herself administrative 
privileges
11
 (steps 3-4). Using the administrative privileges, she can subsequently connect to , 
as  runs , and allocate a new virtual machine ( ) (steps 5-6). The external 
adversary can finally exploit the  vulnerability 
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12
 to gain access to v7 hosted on m2 (steps 7-9). 
 In the last case (Case 2.3) we deal with an unknown adversary ( ) trying to gain 
access to the database content ( ) associated with a specific VM (e.g., ). The cloud 
environment is the same as the one presented in Figure 4. This is a relevant case as it resembles 
the security breach [2] that arised at JP Morgan Chase last year. This security breach can be 
expressed as follows, where the goal of an adversary ( ) is to become an authorised user of v7 
(predicate ) that is already in use by another customer (predicate 
) and copy the content of a database (predicate ) stored on  
(predicate ). 
The attack scenario generated by the planner slightly extends the one presented in the previous 
case adding additional actions related to the database. 
In particular, once  has gained access to  (steps 0-9), she can connect to the database  
using the same credentials she has used to access  (step 10) in order to perform a query on the 
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relevant tables and subsequently copy their content (steps 11-12). In this case an adversary is 
able to gain access to the database content since the cloud provider does not require two-factors 
authentication to access the resources (database) installed in the VMs. 
6. Evidence Collection and Monitoring 
 The attack scenarios generated from the representation of the cloud configuration, the 
security breaches, and the attack modules are used to configure the evidence collection activities. 
We also define the monitoring activity to identify potential changes that may affect the cloud 
configuration and cause modifications in the attacks scenarios. The remainder of this section 
describes the evidence collection and monitoring activities. 
6.1. Evidence Collection 
 The evidence collection activity aims to identify and preserve data indicating that the 
basic actions comprised in the attack scenarios are taking place. During a digital investigation, 
the evidence collected helps demonstrate if and how a security breach took place. Moreover, it 
allows identifying the individuals (customers and providers) responsible for introducing the 
vulnerabilities exploited by the malicious actions comprised in the attack scenario. 
 We map each action in the domain definition to a specific log entry of the software 
affected by the action execution. As the format for log data varies based on the software 
generating the logs we consider a generic and standard format to represent log entries. Our 
format includes the following fields: date and time of action, action identifier, user identifier, 
user IP, additional parameters, action effects, and log source. Additional parameters cover those 
included in the action representation modelled in the domain definition. The log source allow 
identifying the software and the virtual and/or physical machine generating the log entry. 
However, not all fields identified in our generic format have to be mapped to the specific fields 
of a log entry. For example, the log entries related to a user’s login request to a VM only include 
her IP address, while the log entries identifying the authorisation performed during the login can 
also include the user ID and her credentials. 
 An example of a log entry extracted from the log of a VMWare ESXi Client application 
recording user login authorisation to access a specific VM is presented in Figure 5. This log 
entry is associated with the  action in the domain definition. This figure maps the 
log entry fields to our generic log format. Note that the parameter of the  action 
include the user ID and the VM a user is trying to access. The former parameter is inferred 
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directly from the log entry, while the VM is identified from the block of grouped log entries 
pertaining to that VM (e.g., ). Note that the format of the log entries varies depending on 
their source. For example the action ID ([
]) in the log entry defined in Figure 5, would be different if 
another virtualisation software client is adopted. Therefore a mapping between the actions 
present in the domain definition and the ID’s identified in the log entries must be defined at the 
initial setup by the system administrator and updated based on the configuration changes in the 
cloud. 
 Log sources may differ depending on the cloud configuration. A broad categorisation of 
the sources of log data is provided as follows. 
• Application Logs are generated by any software installed in the cloud environment, such as 
Content Management Software (Gecko CMS), Virtual Machine Managers (VMWare vCenter or 
ESXi) or Cloud development platforms (HP Helion). 
• Web Server Logs include information (e.g., user IP addresses, request time/date, address of the 
VM being accessed) about accesses to the VMs. 
• Database Logs contain information generated by database management systems (e.g., IBM 
DB2, Oracle DMS, MongoDB) about queries performed to existing databases, the content 
associated with a query and modifications of databases content. 
• Network Logs are generated by both the web server and the operating system running on a 
physical machine. They record information about how network connections are established, the 
data traffic on the network and who requested the connection. 
• System Logs are generated by the operating systems running on the physical machines 
belonging to the cloud deployment. For example, VMWare WorkStation record information 
about the use and performance of resources. These logs can be further categorised into: 
 – Identity Manager Logs containing data pertaining authentication attempts. 
 – Deployment Logs recording how various resources, such as databases, storage and 
development platforms, are deployed across the cloud, their virtual and physical addresses and 
how and by whom they can be accessed. 
 – Security Logs containing data about login attempts, and granting of user privileges. 
 The attack scenario presented in Case 2.1 described in Section 5.3, deals with an 
authenticated customer gaining access to a VM allocated to another customer. An example of the 
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log data collected for this attack scenario is presented in Table 1. For example, the log entry 
corresponding to the  action is inferred from the web server, application and 
system logs. The web server logs provide the user IP and the date and time a user tries to login to 
her VM. The application logs provide information about which VM a user is attempting to 
connect to while the system logs include information regarding users’ authentication and its 
corresponding outcome. 
6.2. Monitoring 
 Changes in the cloud configuration, i.e. virtual machine or physical machine changes 
described in Section 3, may require the regeneration of the attack scenarios and, consequently, 
modification of the evidence collection strategy. Therefore data identifying virtual and physical 
machine changes must be monitored automatically. Examples of relevant changes are those 
determining the allocation/deallocation of VMs on a physical machine. The data to be monitored, 
pertaining to the allocation/deallocation of VMs, would be generated by the virtualisation 
software installed on the physical machines. Other changes to be monitored are modifications of 
the software configuration of physical and virtual machines. In order to identify software 
configuration changes, the system logs, specifically deployment logs, generated by the operating 
system and virtualisation software deployed on different physical machines must be monitored. 
These changes also require the system administrators to identify the vulnerabilities 
introduced/removed by the software installed/uninstalled, and to update the attack modules 
included in the domain definition accordingly. 
 The evidence collection strategy must be updated in order to reflect the changes in the 
attack scenarios. If the new attack scenarios do not comprise actions that were included in the 
previous evidence collection strategy, the log entries associated with the execution of such 
actions must be removed from the evidence collection strategy. In particular if the attack 
scenarios comprise new (legitimate or malicious) actions that were not identified in the previous 
set of attack scenarios, the log entries associated with those actions must be included in the 
evidence collection strategy. For example, consider the attack scenarios generated for Case 2.1 
and Case 2.2 described in Section 5.3. The difference in the cloud configuration between cases 
2.1 and 2.2 is in the installation of  in . The  software introduces a 
new vulnerability into the cloud as described in Section 5.3. The vulnerability introduces a new 
set of attack modules that can be executed by an adversary to gain access to a VM that she is not 
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authorised to use. When the monitoring activity detects the software configuration changes, it 
regenerates the attack scenarios based on the new vulnerabilities introduced by the change and 
the evidence collection activity is adapted accordingly. Table 2 identifies the differences in the 
actions comprised in either attack scenario. Additional actions included in the attack scenario 
generated for Case 2.2 are  and . These 
new actions require the logging of access attempts performed by legitimate customers and the 
authorisation of external users to access a VM. Data pertaining to these actions can be found in 
the Web Server logs, Identity Manager logs and Security Logs. 
7. Evaluation 
 We evaluated our approach from both a qualitative and a quantitative perspective. From a 
qualitative perspective we estimate the percentage of data that our approach avoids collecting, 
compared to the case in which all possible data are preserved. We also discuss the effectiveness 
of our approach in handling false positives and negatives. From a quantitative perspective, we 
measured the overhead of generating attack scenarios and performing evidence collection 
activities in a real cloud environment. 
7.1. Qualitative Evaluation 
 Our approach for adaptive evidence collection reduces the quantity of log data to be 
collected and stored for future use during digital investigations of security breaches in the cloud. 
The log data comprises events generated from the software installed in the physical machines, 
network traffic, allocation/deallocation of virtual machines, and changes in their software 
configuration. Preserving all the log data increases the operational cost due to the requirement of 
external storage capabilities. It also increases the effort necessary to forensic examiners and 
automated tools to analyse the data in order to reconstruct the events leading to a security breach. 
As an example, let us consider a medium sized organisation [27] composed of around 250 users, 
250 user end points, 5 offices, 2 subnets, 2 databases, and a central data centre. We can assume 
that each subnet has an IPS, a switch and gateway/router, and the whole organisation has 2 
firewalls and a VPN. In such a scenario potential evidence includes events generated from each 
user end point, such as login/logout, files access/creation/modification/deletion, and network 
traffic. We estimated having 50 Events Per Second (EPS) during non peaks and 2500 EPS during 
peaks. If an organisation experiences peaks for 5% of the total time, we will have an average of 
215 EPS (125 EPS for non-peak and 90 for peak) and, consequently, around 278640000 events 
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in 15 days. Assuming that each event occupies around 50KB, the size of the database storing 
events happening within 15 days should be at least around 15TB. 
 Our approach uses attack scenarios to focus data collection only on the events that might 
be relevant for investigating possible security breaches, i.e. those determining whether the steps 
of the attack scenarios took place. Quantifying the reduction in the evidence to be collected 
highly depends on the cloud configuration and on the actions comprising the attack scenarios. In 
this section, we compare the number of actions whose log entries that the attack scenarios 
prescribe to collect with all possible log entries that can be collected. These possible log entries 
correspond to the actions defined within the domain definition of the cloud environment as 
described in Section 4. 
 Table 3 shows a rough estimation in the reduction of collected evidence for all cases 
presented in Section 5. For example, the cloud configuration shown in Figure 2 includes 11 
unique action types, dealing with the creation, allocation and deallocation of VMs, the 
authentication and authorisation of users, and the execution of services and malicious actions 
exploiting vulnerabilities. The attack scenario generated in Case 1.1 for this cloud configuration 
only includes 4 unique action types. Therefore, our approach only prescribes to preserve the log 
entries associated with the action types identified in the attack scenario as opposed to those 
identified in the domain definition, reducing the amount of log data preserved by 63%. As 
described earlier, when a new attack scenario is generated any additional action to be monitored 
is added to the evidence collection activity. Starting from Case 1.1, we include attack scenarios 
incrementally, adapt the evidence collection activity accordingly, and calculate the reduction in 
the amount of data collected. However, note that this an estimated theoretical measure that 
depends on the cloud configuration adopted. As described in Section 7.2, in real cloud 
environments this measure can vary depending on the number of actions that are executed at 
runtime, which determine the amount of log entries that are generated dynamically. 
 Another advantage of our approach is that it adapts the data collection strategies as soon 
as changes in the cloud configuration or in the available attack modules are detected. These 
modifications determine the generation of new/different attack scenarios that drive the adaptation 
of the evidence collection strategies. 
 False positives and negatives can threaten the validity of our approach. False positives 
correspond to attack scenarios that do not lead to security breaches. This can happen when a 
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vulnerability exploited by an attack module comprised in the attack scenario has been fixed. For 
example, if we consider the second insider attack described in Section 5.2.1, we can give rise to a 
false positive if Windows Xp ServicePack 2 installed on M3 is updated and its vulnerability 
( ) is fixed. Additionally, false positives can also arise when specific security 
controls have been put in place by cloud security administrators to prevent generated attack 
scenarios. For example, to make it less likely or invalidate the insider attack scenarios described 
in Section 5.2.1, additional authentication can be required to perform a copy of a VM. Although 
false positives are undesirable, they do not pose risks in terms of loss of data that might be 
relevant in future digital forensic investigations. Instead, they might cause the collection of 
irrelevant evidence. False positives can be avoided by re-generating the attack scenarios over an 
updated domain model reflecting the current cloud configuration, where the legitimate and 
malicious actions reflect the information coming from the security controls and the vulnerability 
databases, respectively. 
 False negatives can pose higher security risks since they represent the missed 
identification of potential attack scenarios, which can cause the loss of evidence that might be 
relevant in future digital forensic investigations. False negatives might arise from an incomplete 
domain definition that does not include all cloud configuration components (e.g., installed 
software, allocated VMs and storage), it might neglect legitimate actions that a user is allowed to 
perform, or it might not cover all possible attack modules exploiting known vulnerabilities. In 
such cases, false negatives can be avoided by constantly updating the representation of the cloud 
configuration and the attack modules as soon as changes in the real cloud platform take place or 
when vulnerability databases are updated with new vulnerabilities that can be brought by the 
software installed in the cloud platform. In other cases, false negatives might be caused by 
vulnerabilities that are not known to the software vendor and might lead to unexpected zero-day 
attacks. To address false negatives a possible solution would be to preserve all the logs 
associated with the software components of the cloud configuration. However, this solution 
might be inefficient as it can have increased time and storage overheads. An alternative solution 
would be to use honeypots [28], which are decoy servers used as a trap to detect and analyse 
(new) malware, the vulnerabilities they exploit and their possible sources. Malware identified 
with honeypots can be used to update the domain definition with new attack modules, triggering 
an update in the possible attack scenarios and in the evidence collection activities. However, we 
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recognise that malware analysis cannot always be fully automated. Further investigation on the 
use of honeypots to update attack modules will be addressed in future work. 
7.2. Quantitative Evaluation 
 We assessed the efficiency of the planner (SGPlan5) in generating attack scenarios for 
cloud configurations of increasing complexity, and the absolute and relative overhead in terms of 
storage capacity and time necessary to perform evidence collection activities in a real cloud 
infrastructure. 
7.2.1. Planning Efficiency 
 We measured the efficiency of SGPlan5 for generating attack scenarios for cloud 
configurations of increasing size (problem expansion) and attack scenarios comprising an 
increasing number of actions (attack expansion). Our experiments were conducted on an Ubuntu 
(64bit) virtual machine using 6GB RAM and hosted on a Mac OS 10.10.2, with 2.6GHz Intel 
Core I7 processor and 16GB RAM. 
 Problem Expansion. For the first experiment we consider a cloud configuration where the 
size of the problem definition is expanded at each iteration, while the number of steps of the 
generated attack scenarios remains constant (8 steps). We expand the size of the problem 
definition by starting from the cloud configuration defined in Section 5.1, hereafter referred to as 
a machine cluster. In particular, our machine cluster consists of 10 virtual machines, hosted on 3 
physical machines, where each physical machine in the cluster can establish a network 
connection to each other. Each cluster is connected to another one in sequence, i.e. a machine in 
the cluster can establish a network connection with a machine belonging to a subsequent cluster. 
In this way all machines in a cluster are reachable by traversing a specific number of machines in 
the cloud configuration. We start from 5 machine clusters and progressively add 5 machine 
clusters to the cloud configuration. The crime objective is to gain credentials to login to  
belonging to the first cluster included in the cloud configuration. The time taken by the planner 
to generate the attack scenarios for cloud configurations having an increasing number of entities 
(e.g., VMs, physical machines, and networks) is presented in Table 4. From our results, we can 
deduce that the time increases exponentially depending on the size of the problem definition. 
 Attack Expansion. In this case we adopt and maintain a cloud configuration comprising 
30 machine clusters. The crime goal at each iteration is to gain login credentials to access a 
physical machine belonging to a farther machine cluster. In particular, at each iteration the crime 
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goal changes in order to enforce the generation of attack scenarios that should traverse five more 
clusters. The time taken by SGPlan5 to generate the attack scenarios comprising an increasing 
number of actions is presented in Table 5. From this table we can deduce that the complexity of 
the attack scenario does have an impact on the efficiency of the planner. However this is 
marginal compared to the impact determined by the cloud configuration size shown in Table 4. 
7.2.2. Overhead of Evidence Collection Activities 
 To assess the overhead of evidence collection activities we developed a more complete 
example leveraging databases and storage resources. Our example was deployed on the Google 
Cloud Platform
13
; this choice allows repeatability of results as Google Cloud Platform provides 
consistent CPU, memory and disk performance. 
 The cloud configuration of our example is very similar to that proposed to explain the 
attack scenarios generation in Section 5. It comprises physical machines  and , which were 
hosted in North America, and physical machine , which was located in Europe. Each physical 
machine can accept network connections from the others and can host some VMs. In particular, 
 hosted , ,  and ,  hosted ,  and , and  hosted  and . As the 
software configuration of each physical machine is not released publicly by Google Cloud 
Platform, we assumed that the service provider has no control over it. Each VM type was 
, which allocates a single CPU on the Intel Sandy Bridge platform with a memory of 
0.6GB. The operating system of each VM was Ubuntu 14.04 LTS. Virtual machines  to  
served as backend servers controlled by the cloud service provider while  to  were 
designated as allocatable frontends, which could be outsourced to customers to run their own 
applications. 
 The backend VMs ran the MongoDB database software which provided database access 
to the applications running on the frontend VMs. This example focuses on the vulnerabilities 
introduced by MongoDB, specifically 
14
 and 
15
. The 
vulnerability described in  allows an authenticated user to obtain internal 
system privileges by leveraging username “ ”. This would allow a user to escalate her 
privileges and gain access to data in the database associated with other VMs not allocated to her. 
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The vulnerability described in  allows a user with the appropriate privileges 
to copy the credentials granted to other users of the database. This was caused by MongoDB 
disclosing the users’ credentials in its log files, which are accessible by users having root 
privileges. In this example we consider two users  and . The frontend VMs ,  and  
are allocated to , while  and  are allocated to . The database  is hosted on . 
The security breach we considered in this example was  being able to copy the credentials of 
. The attack scenario generated for this security breach is the following: 
 In this scenario,  performs the login to  and requests access to the database (steps 
0-1). Then, database  is allocated to  used by  (step 2), and  authorises an 
application installed by  on  to access the database (step 3). Subsequently,  exploits a 
vulnerability of  to mask her username and escalate her privileges (steps 4-5). Once 
 has escalated her privileges, she can gain command line access and copy the credentials of 
another user, e.g.,  (steps 7-8). This is due to the fact that anytime a user accesses the 
database, her credentials are written in the MongoDB log file (steps 6). Once  has copied ’s 
credentials, she can execute the same operations  is granted to perform. 
 The operations identified in the attack scenario above were mapped to relevant log files, 
as shown in Table 6. Column Action ID identifies the action performed at each step of the attack 
scenario, while columns Log Type and Log Name refer respectively to the type and name of the 
log file from which evidence that the corresponding action is taking place should be collected. 
We also distinguish whether the log file is located on the backend or frontend VMs; this allows 
us to separate responsibility for evidence collection between the service provider and the 
customer, respectively. The log entries relevant to the attack scenario were extracted and stored 
in a separate file. 
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 For this example, log types can refer to: a) Cloud System Logs, containing operations 
related to the deployment of databases and VMs on physical machines, b) VM System Logs 
registering the operations performed within the VM by a customer such as installation of 
applications, accesses to a database, copies of data, and c) Application Logs, generated by the 
applications installed on a VM and containing user access history, operations performed and 
resources used. The log files from which evidence was extracted are the following: 
• auth.log contains log entries pertaining to the authorisation of customers logging to VMs. Each 
log entry includes the following fields: time, customer’s IP address, and SSH key used to 
perform the login. 
• activity_log.json records the system level operations performed by the administrator to handle 
customers’ requests and resource allocation. 
• mongodb.log includes the operations performed during the usage of the MongoDB application. 
• syslog.log is the system log generated by the operating system running on a VM. 
 As the frontend VMs of our scenario ran a web-based application accessing the 
MongoDB database, we simulated the customers’ utilisation of such applications by reproducing 
the behaviour (read/write operations) of the Yahoo! Cloud Serving Benchmark (YCSB)
16
, which 
is used to compare the performance of NoSQL database management systems, such as 
MongoDB. In particular we considered the following cases: 
• Case 1 considers the actions necessary to set up the cloud configuration shown in Figure 6 and 
those performed by customer  to perpetrate the security breach illustrated previously. 
• Case 2 considers the actions of Case 1 and assumes that the interaction of the customers with 
the frontend services generated 10000 operations requiring access to MongoDB. 
• Case 3 considers the actions of Case 1 and assumes that the interaction of the customers with 
the frontend services generated 50000 operations requiring access to MongoDB. 
• Case 4 considers the actions of Case 1 and assumes that the interaction of the customers with 
the frontend services generated 100000 operations requiring access to MongoDB. 
 Table 7 shows the operations generated for each case and the absolute and relative 
storage overheads determined by evidence collection activities. The relative storage overhead 
obtained by preserving only the log entries associated with the steps of the attack scenarios was 
about 30 KB for each of the four cases. As it is possible to note the reduction in the storage 
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overhead increases as the number of operations that are not related to the attack scenario 
increases. In particular, the reduction in the storage overhead was 96%  in Case 1 and reached 
99.9%  in Case 4. 
 As the time overhead determined by the attack scenarios generation has already been 
discussed in Section 7.2.1, we now assess the time overhead determined by the log extraction 
operations performed during evidence collection. In particular, we compare the time taken to 
extract the logs necessary to detect the attack scenario ( 3 0 KB) with that necessary to extract an 
arbitrary number of logs proportional to the number of customers’ operations performed in Cases 
2-4. Table 8 presents the amount of logs extracted and the corresponding time overhead. From 
our results we can conclude that the time overhead introduced by the evidence collection 
activities is minimal and linearly increases with the amount of logs to be extracted. 
8. Conclusion 
 In this paper we proposed the use of attack scenarios to configure evidence collection 
activities at the cloud service provider premises. In particular, we focused these activities on the 
preservation of the data necessary to detect the attack scenarios that can be perpetrated within the 
current cloud deployment. Moreover, we adapted evidence collection activities depending on 
changes in the cloud configuration or in the vulnerabilities that are brought by the software 
installed in the physical and virtual machines present in the cloud configuration. The method 
proposed in this paper can collect forensic evidence for those attacks exploiting known 
vulnerabilities and does not consider zero-day attacks exploiting unknown vulnerabilities. It is 
out of the scope of this paper to preserve evidence for security breaches determined by unknown 
vulnerabilities and this problem will be addressed in future work. 
 Our results demonstrate that using attack scenarios allows reducing the data collected in 
the cloud by focusing on those security breaches that are likely, while saving space and time 
necessary to store and process such data. Furthermore, planning techniques for generating the 
attack scenarios exhibit negligible times even for realistic data centres including 90 physical 
machines and 300 VMs. To generate attack scenarios for bigger cloud deployments in future 
work we will also investigate techniques to partition the domain and problem definition 
representing the cloud configuration. Although our approach has been applied to attack scenarios 
targeting cloud customers and providers of a IaaS cloud deployment, its benefits also apply to 
other cloud deployments, such as PaaS (Platform as a Service) and SaaS (Software as a Service). 
Page 32 of 42
 One of the limitations of our approach is the potential loss of relevant evidence in case 
some of the possible attack scenarios are not generated. To address this issue, we will investigate 
the use of mutation testing [29, 30, 31], which has been used to evaluate the quality of generated 
software test cases. Mutation testing aims to apply small modifications to a software program in 
order to check whether the test cases can identify the introduced fault. We can reuse mutation 
testing to apply small changes to the cloud configuration in order to identify whether some 
additional attack scenario can be realised. As described in Section 7.1, another solution to 
identify a more complete set of attack scenarios is to analyse malware collected through 
honeypots. In particular, we will analyse bot malware, which is self-propagating malware that 
infects a host and connects back to a central server forming a network of compromised devices. 
The identification of attack scenarios taking into account this kind of malware can be particularly 
useful for considering additional kinds of attack scenarios in which the cloud is used as a vehicle 
to perpetrate an attack. Finally we will map the model of the cloud configuration to existing 
cloud security reference architectures (e.g., [24]); this will make our approach more systematic 
as it would allow us to discover a more complete set of security breaches and attack scenarios 
arising from the interaction of the stakeholders with the cloud system. 
 Finally, we recognise that a further trigger for adapting changes in evidence collection is 
jurisdictional changes. These changes refer to the modification of the privacy and security 
regulations within the jurisdiction for which the cloud resources belong. A new regulation might 
allow for the collection of additional data or might further restrict what data can be collected. In 
either case, the evidence collection activity must adapt. How to adapt evidence collection 
activities depending on jurisdictional changes will be explored in future work. 
Acknowledgment 
 This work was partially supported by the Science Foundation Ireland grants 10/CE/I1855 
and 13/RC/2094, and the ERC Advanced Grant no. 291652 (ASAP). 
References 
[1] M. S. Blumenthal, Hide and seek in the cloud, IEEE Security & Privacy 8 (2) (2010) 57–58. 
[2] J. Cook, Tech More: JP Morgan Hacking JP Morgan Got Hacked Because It Forgot To 
Enable Two-Factor Authentication On A Server, http://tinyurl.com/p5226yd (2014). 
[3] R. Rowlingson, A Ten Step Process for Forensic Readiness, International Journal of Digital 
Evidence 2 (3) (2004) 1–28. 
Page 33 of 42
[4] C. Sarraute, Automated attack planning, CoRR abs/1307.7808. 
[5] E. Gutesman, A. Waissbein, The Impact of Predicting Attacker Tools in Security Risk 
Assessments, in: Proc. of the 6th Workshop on Cyber Security and Information Intelligence 
Research, 2010, pp. 75:1–75:4. 
[6] L. Krautsevich, F. Martinelli, A. Yautsiukhin, Towards Modelling Adaptive Attacker’s 
Behaviour, in: Foundations and Practice of Security, Springer, 2013, pp. 357–364. 
[7] C. Sarraute, O. Buffet, J. Hoffmann, POMDPs Make Better Hackers: Accounting for 
Uncertainty in Penetration Testing, in: Proc. of the 26th AAAI Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence, 2012. 
[8] E. LeMay, M. D. Ford, K. Keefe, W. H. Sanders, C. Muehrcke, Model-based Security 
Metrics Using Adversary View Security Evaluation (advise), in: Proc. of the 8th International 
Conference on Quantitative Evaluation of Systems, 2011, pp. 191–200. 
[9] L. Pasquale, Y. Yu, M. Salehie, L. Cavallaro, T. T. Tun, B. Nuseibeh, Requirements-Driven 
Adaptive Digital Forensics, in: Proc. of the 21st Int. Requirements Engineering Conf., 2013, pp. 
340–341. 
[10] L. Pasquale, Y. Yu, L. Cavallaro, M. Salehie, T. T. Tun, B. Nuseibeh, Engineering Adaptive 
Digital Investigations using Forensics Requirements, CoRR abs/1402.0997. 
[11] J. Dykstra, A. T. Sherman, Understanding Issues in Cloud Forensics: Two Hypothetical 
Case Studies, in: Proceedings of the Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2011, 
pp. 45–54. 
[12] S. D. Wolthusen, Overcast: Forensic Discovery in Cloud Environments, in: Proc. of the 5th 
International Conference on IT Security Incident Management and IT Forensics, 2009, pp. 3–9. 
[13] M. Taylor, J. Haggerty, D. Gresty, D. Lamb, Forensic Investigation of Cloud Computing 
Systems, Network Security 2011 (3) (2011) 4–10. 
[14] K. Ruan, J. Carthy, T. Kechadi, M. Crosbie, Cloud Forensics: An Overview, Proc. of the 7th 
IFIP Int. Conf. on Digital Forensics. 
[15] G. Grispos, T. Storer, W. B. Glisson, Calm Before the Storm: The Challenges of Cloud 
Computing in Digital Forensics, Vol. 4 Issue 2, IGI Global, 2012. 
[16] D. Reilly, C. Wren, T. Berry, Cloud Computing: Forensic Challenges for Law Enforcement, 
in: Proc. of the 5th International Conference for Internet Technology and Secured Transactions, 
2010, pp. 1–7. 
Page 34 of 42
[17] D. Birk, C. Wegener, Technical Issues of Forensic Investigations in Cloud Computing 
Environments, in: Proc. of the 6th International Workshop on Systematic Approaches to Digital 
Forensic Engineering, 2011, pp. 1–10. 
[18] J. Dykstra, A. T. Sherman, Acquiring Forensic Evidence from Infrastructure-as-a-Service 
Cloud Computing, Digital Investigation 9 (2012) S90–S98. 
[19] Guidance Software, EnCase Forensics – Computer Forensics Data Collection for Digital 
Evidence Examiners, http://www.guidancesoftare.com/encase-forensics.htm. 
[20] AccessData, FTK – AccessData Digital Forensics Software, 
http://www.accessdata.com/products/digital-forensics/ftk. 
[21] J. Dykstra, A. T. Sherman, Design and Implementation of FROST: Digital Forensic Tools 
for the OpenStack Cloud Computing Platform, Digital Investigation 10, Supplement (0) (2013) 
S87 – S95. 
[22] C. Shields, O. Frieder, M. Maloof, A System for the Proactive, Continuous, and Efficient 
Collection of Digital Forensic Evidence, in: Digital Investigations, Vol. 8, 2011, pp. 3–13. 
[23] S. Pearson, R. Watson, Digital Triage Forensics: Processing the Digital Crime Scene, 
Syngress, 2010. 
[24] E. B. Fernandez, R. Monge, K. Hashizume, Building a Security Reference Architecture for 
Cloud Systems, Requirements Engineering (2015) 1–25. 
[25] J. C. Pelaez, E. B. Fernández, M. M. Larrondo-Petrie, Misuse Patterns in VoIP, Security and 
Communication Networks 2 (6) (2009) 635–653. 
[26] W. R. Claycomb, A. Nicoll, Insider Threats to Cloud Computing: Directions for New 
Research Challenges, in: Proc. of the 36th Conf. of Computer Software and Applications 
Conference, 2012, pp. 387–394. 
[27] M. Butler, Benchmarking Security Information Event Management (SIEM), 
http://tinyurl.com/q2vdd5s (2009). 
[28] K. G. Anagnostakis, S. Sidiroglou, P. Akritidis, K. Xinidis, E. Markatos, A. D. Keromytis, 
Detecting Targeted Attacks Using Shadow Honeypots, in: Proc. of the 14th Conf. on USENIX 
Security Symposium, 2005, pp. 9–9. 
[29] E. Martin, T. Xie, A Fault Model and Mutation Testing of Access Control Policies, in: Proc. 
of the 16th International Conference on World Wide Web, 2007, pp. 667–676. 
[30] Y. Maezawa, H. Washizaki, S. Honiden, Extracting Interaction-Based Stateful Behavior in 
Page 35 of 42
Rich Internet Applications, in: Proc. of the 16th European Conference on Software Maintenance 
and Reengineering, 2012, pp. 423–428. 
[31] Y. L. Traon, T. Mouelhi, B. Baudry, Testing Security Policies: Going Beyond Functional 
Testing, in: Proc. of the 18th International Symposium on Software Reliability, 2007, pp. 
93–102. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Overview of our approach for adaptive evidence collection. 
Figure 2: Initial Cloud Configuration. 
Figure 3: Cloud Configuration - Known Outsider Attack. 
Figure 4: Cloud Environment - Unknown Outsider Attack. 
Figure 5: VMWare ESXi VI Client Log entry: User login authorisation to access a VM. 
Figure 6: Evaluation Cloud Configuration. 
 
 
Table 1: Log Data Generated in Case 2.1 
Acti
on # 
User IP Us
er 
ID 
Date/Tim
e of 
Action 
Action ID Action 
Paramet
ers 
Action Effects Source 
0. 209.121.62.
135 
C1 [15/Mar/2
015 
17:37:23 
+0:00] 
login-cust [C1 V5] “logged_cust 
C1 V5” 
Web 
Server 
Logs, 
Applicat
ion 
Logs, 
System 
Logs 
1.  C1 [15/Mar/2
015 
17:37:33 
run-service-rvc [C1 V5 
M1] 
“has_service 
C1 rvc M1” 
System 
Logs, 
Applicat
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+0:00] ion Logs 
2.  C1 [15/Mar/2
015 
17:37:43 
+0:00] 
make-admin-loc
al 
[C1 V5 
M1 
ALS 
DA] 
“authorized_a
dmin C1 
loginop M1” 
“admin-dom 
C1 DA” 
“authorized_a
dmin C1 
copyvm M1” 
“admin C1 
M1” 
System 
Logs 
3. 209.121.62.
135 
C1 [15/Mar/2
015 
17:37:53 
+0:00] 
connect-over-ne
twork 
[C1 M1 
M2 
port505
3 RVC] 
“has_credenti
als C1 M2” 
Network 
Logs, 
Web 
Server 
Logs 
4. 209.121.62.
135 
C1 [15/Mar/2
015 
17:38:03 
+0:00] 
allocate-vm [V6 C1] “use-vm C1 
V6” 
“authorized_c
ust C1 V6” 
Applicat
ion Logs 
5. 209.121.62.
135 
C1 [15/Mar/2
015 
17:38:13 
+0:00] 
login-cust [C1 V6] “logged_cust 
C1 V6” 
Web 
Server 
Logs, 
System 
Logs 
6.  C1 [15/Mar/2
015 
17:38:23 
+0:00] 
get-service-als [C1 V6 
M2] 
“has_service 
C1 als M1” 
System 
Logs, 
Applicat
ion Logs 
7.  C1 [15/Mar/2
015 
connect-unowne
d-vm 
[C1 V6 
V7 M2] 
“authorized_c
ust C1 V7” 
System 
Logs 
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17:38:33 
+0:00] 
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 Table 2: Changes in the evidence collection strategy when moving from Case 2.1 to Case 2.2. 
Case 2.1 Case 2.2 Evidence 
Collection 
Change 
allocate-vm allocate-vm  
login-cust login-cust  
 connect-to-vm-browser Access to 
VMs 
performed 
by 
authorised 
customers 
through a 
web 
browser. 
 make-user-vm-gekco Creation of 
new users of 
the VM by 
Gecko CMS. 
run-service-rvc run-service-rvc   
make-admin-local make-admin-local   
connect-over-network connect-over-network   
get-service-als get-service-als   
connect-unowned-vm connect-unowned-vm   
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 Table 3: Reduction in Data Collection. 
Case No. # Cloud 
Configuration 
Actions 
# Monitored 
Actions 
Reduction 
Percentage 
1.1 11 4 64% 
1.1,1.2 15 8 47% 
1.1,1.2,2.1 19 14 26% 
1.1,1.2,2.1,2.2 23 16 30% 
1.1,1.2,2.1,2.2,2.3 30 19 37% 
 
 
Table 4: Evaluation of SGPlan5: Domain Expansion. 
# Clusters # VMs # Physical 
machines 
# Networks Time (sec) 
5 50 15 9 0.10 
10 100 30 19 0.87 
15 150 45 29 3.70 
20 200 60 39 10.13 
25 250 75 49 24.55 
30 300 90 59 46.79 
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 Table 5: Evaluation of SGPlan5: Attack Expansion. 
# Clusters 
Traversed 
# Actions Time (sec) 
5 44 46.79 
10 89 49.32 
15 134 56.30 
20 179 68.74 
25 224 87.50 
30 269 116.13 
 
Table 6: Mapping the steps of the attack scenario to the relevant logs files. 
Action ID Log Type Log Name 
login_cust VM System 
Log 
auth.log 
(Frontend VM) 
request_db Cloud 
System Logs 
activity_log.JSON 
(Cloud) 
allocate_db Cloud 
System Logs 
activity_log.JSON 
(Cloud) 
autherise_to_db VM System 
Log 
mongodb.log 
(Backend VM) 
mask_username VM System 
Log 
syslog.log 
(Backend VM) 
escalate_privilege Application 
Log 
mongodb.log 
(Backend VM) 
login_db Application 
Log 
mongodb.log 
(Backend VM) 
write_db Application 
Log 
mongodb.log 
(Backend VM) 
get_service_cmdline VM System syslog.log 
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Log (Backend VM) 
copy_credentials VM System 
Log 
syslog.log 
(Backend VM) 
 
 
Table 7: Storage overhead. 
Case # of Actions Relative 
Overhead 
(KB) 
Absolute 
Overhead 
(KB) 
1 Setup 30 810 
2 Setup + 
10000 
30 7770 
3 Setup + 
50000 
30 35620 
4 Setup + 
100000 
30 70640 
 
 
Table 8: Time Overhead. 
Case Logs 
Extracted 
(KB) 
Real 
Overhead 
(sec) 
2 30 0.54 
 577 0.57 
3 30 1.89 
 2970 1.99 
4 30 2.95 
 6042 3.28 
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